I argue that Aristotle believes that virtue comes in degrees. After dispatching with initial concerns for the view, I argue that we should accept it because Aristotle conceives of heroic virtue as the highest degree of virtue. I support this interpretation of heroic virtue by considering and rejecting alternative readings, then showing that heroic virtue characterized as the highest degree of virtue is consistent with the doctrine of the mean.
In this paper I investigate two issues regarding Aristotle's ethical landscape in his Nicomachean Ethics, both of which have received less scholarly attention than they deserve. The first is whether Aristotle believes that there are degrees of true human virtue, henceforth, 'DOV'. 1 The second is how Aristotle conceives of heroic virtue. 2 I take these two issues to be intimately related-a claim I argue for below-so that any light shed on one of them will likewise illuminate the other. My investigation proceeds as follows. First, I consider the question of whether Aristotle endorses DOV. After raising and replying to some apparent problems with an affirmative answer, I argue that since Aristotle holds that there are people who have heroic virtue, that is, I'll claim, have the highest degree of virtue, he is committed to DOV. Because my argument relies on the claim that heroic virtue is the highest degree of virtue, I turn next to a defense of this interpretation. To this end, I examine alternative interpretations of heroic virtue. After arguing that each alternative interpretation fails, I detail my account of heroic virtue as 1 Although some commentators seem to agree with my claim that Aristotle endorses DOV (e.g., Curzer 1996 , 240, and 2012 , Drefcinski 1996 , 144, Hardie 1978 , 72, and Sherman 1989 , to my knowledge there has never been a thorough examination of the issue.
the highest degree of virtue. This is no small task, however, since it requires both considering how heroic virtue fits in with Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, and identifying how good agents can vary with regard to virtue.
I. Identifying the issue: a characterization of DOV
The fundamental issue in this paper is whether Aristotle allows for degrees of true human virtue. Here it will help us zero in on our target by ruling out what this does not mean.
First, this is not about Aristotle's distinction between virtues of character and virtues of intellect. Although the questions of how these states relate to one another, and which, if either, takes precedence, are important, they are not my present concern. Second, I am not inquiring into the difference between natural virtue and true/complete virtue (ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν, 1144b3). Natural virtues, Aristotle tells us, are temperaments with which people are born; an agent does not possess true virtue until these temperaments are combined with phronesis. Thus, someone who only has natural virtue lacks true virtue, and the difference is not a matter of degree but of kind. Again, although this distinction is important, it is not what I am interested in here. Rather, I am investigating whether Aristotle believes that there can be (positive) degrees of true/complete virtue. 3 Another way to put the question at hand is to ask whether or not 4 So, Aristotle's text is ambivalent regarding DOV. Perhaps, then, a call to charity is in order. That is, all parties agree that we should interpret Aristotle charitably. And not only do most contemporary ethicists (along, presumably, with most non-philosophers who reflect on ethics) accept DOV, many might think that rejecting it would be absurd.
Accordingly, since most people today take DOV as obvious, and since the text is indeterminate, charity requires us to read Aristotle as endorsing DOV.
Employing this proposal becomes difficult, however, when one considers the ancient orthodoxy regarding DOV. That is because even if commonplace today,
proponents of DOV appear to have been in the minority in antiquity, at least among philosophers. 8 For instance, Socrates-at least as Plato portrays him in the early dialogues-held that true virtue is (or requires) wisdom of a type that is more than human. 9 For him, then, true virtue seems to be an ideal, dependent on perfect knowledge of virtue terms. Thus, since virtue is an ideal-even if an attainable ideal-all good agents would be perfectly, and so equally, good. Hence, Socrates would reject DOV.
Next, take Plato. According to the view we find in the Republic, true virtue is possible only in an ideal state or as a gift from the gods. 10 Either way, the possession of virtue requires contact with perfection, which suggests that to be good is to be perfectly so.
Even outside of the Republic Plato consistently ties the possession of virtue to ideal 8 In Greek poetry the strand of thought that true goodness is perfection, and perfection is the sole province 5 wisdom. 11 So, for Aristotle's teacher, it seems that to count as good is to be completely good. And if this is so, then there isn't room for degrees when it comes to virtue.
12
Admittedly, Plato never explicitly addresses DOV in his dialogues. So, the foregoing is speculative. We don't need to speculate, however, regarding what many of the philosophers after Aristotle thought about DOV, as they directly and unequivocally came out against it. The clearest case is that of the Stoics, who argued that to fall short of perfect virtue, no matter how close one is to it, is to be vicious. 13 Moreover, as we shall see below, later members of Aristotle's own school denied DOV. Much of the work of Peripatetics came in the form of commentaries on Aristotle's works and in these commentaries at least one prominent Aristotelian interpreted his forebear as denying DOV, an interpretation that remains common to this day.
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In light of the above, it is clear that in order to settle on an answer to this question, one must go beyond individual passages and our current ethical intuitions, and instead determine Aristotle's deepest ethical convictions and use these as a framework to sort out his stance on DOV. Unfortunately for those who think that Aristotle accepts it, DOV seems to conflict with several fundamental aspects of his ethics. In the following section I'll focus on two of these aspects and show that although they initially seem to conflict with DOV, the problems they pose are merely apparent.
11 cf. Phaedo 67a1, 76b1-c2, and 82d5-84b5.
12 To be clear, though, it is possible to deny DOV while maintaining that virtue is not an ideal. Aristotle claims that unlike craft, which can be employed for good or bad ends, phronesis aims only at the good. Thus, he thinks that phronesis 'automatically includes' goodness. Here it is worth noting that just as I think Aristotle endorses the view that virtue comes in degrees, I think that he holds the same for phronesis. 30 Admittedly, this seems to contradict 1106a27-28. But if we consider Aristotle's goal in this passage, the tension can be mitigated. Aristotle's point in this passage is in service of his distinction between two types of means, the mathematical mean and the mean relative to us. And as Lesley Brown has shown, Aristotle speaks rather broadly in this passage in order to make his point, offering claims that appear to be universal but by his own lights allow for exceptions (1997 ( , 89, cf. Brown 2014 . Thus, it is plausible that he does not really think that it is the case that everything that is continuous (and so comes in degrees) admits of deficiency, mean, and excess. Turning now to the second required but dubious assumption, namely that excess is necessarily negative. This assumption seems to be required in order for the possibility of an excess of virtue to be problematic. The Greek word in question is 'ὑπερβολή', which Aristotle uses at 1106a28. But it must be noted that in introducing heroic virtue
Aristotle he uses the same word (ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, 1145a24). But heroic virtue is surely good. So, it is not the case that Aristotle believes that any condition that is in some way ὑπερβολή is thereby bad. 32 Thus, we have good reason to deny this second assumption.
This last point takes us to the doorstep of a further, and I believe, definitive reason to reject Aspasius' interpretation that Aristotle denies DOV. As we have just seen
Aristotle says that individuals with what he calls 'heroic virtue' possess 'exceedingly great virtue' (ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, 1145a24). The most obvious way to understand this claim is that heroic virtue is normal human virtue to the greatest degree. Thus, it seems here Aristotle is committing himself to DOV. So, Aspasius must be wrong. Now, it is important to realize that in mentioning heroic virtue, Aristotle is not making an insignificant point; this is not a single passage among many others. Rather, in bringing up heroic virtue Aristotle is sketching his whole ethical landscape, which ranges from the lowest form of vice to the highest form of virtue. Thus, if we can show conclusively that
Aristotle conceives of heroic virtue as the highest degree of virtue, we will be able to set 32 We can arrive at the same point if we consider a bullseye. A bullseye is not a single point. Rather, it covers some space. Accordingly, three shots can hit the bullseye but hit it in different positions, with one being furthest from the middle, another being at the middlemost point of the bullseye (so nearer the middle), and the third being somewhere between these two. So, in this example, the middlemost shot is a sort of extreme, but it is still within the bullseye, and indeed, it is most on the bullseye.
aside Aspasius' objection, confidently ascribe to Aristotle DOV, and, most importantly, gain important insight into the whole of his ethical system. Accordingly, let's now turn to a full treatment of heroic virtue.
III. Possible accounts of heroic virtue
Aristotle introduces heroic virtue at the start of Book VII (= EE VI). In the course of about fifteen lines, which comprise all of his explicit remarks on this issue, Aristotle tells us that it is the highest of six possible conditions of human character, the opposite of the lowest condition, bestiality. In attempting to find the right way to characterize this state, he refers to it as 'heroic' (ἡρωικός, 1145a20) virtue, my preferred term, 'divine' (Θεῖος, 1145a20) virtue, and 'exceedingly great virtue' (ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, 1145a24).
Additionally, he tells us that people with this condition are rare (1145a27 In order to explain why he had heroic virtue, Aristotle says that Hector was exceedingly good (σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός). The wording here indicates that Hector's goodness is the same in kind as the goodness of other people; it is simply that he has more of it. Again, Aristotle claims that the Spartans ascribe to someone heroic virtue if they admire that person very much (ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα). Since admiration is the sort of attitude that one has toward someone with human virtue (cf. Republic 426d3), Aristotle's claim here
indicates that a person with heroic virtue has the same virtue in kind as other good people, but has more of it, and so, is more admired.
The third alternative interpretation is that heroic virtue is the supreme virtue of theoretical study, described by Aristotle in Book X, chapters 7 and 8. 47 Initially this reading seems plausible since Aristotle refers to heroic virtue as godlike and also claims that the life of theoretical study is "superior to the human level" and is "divine in comparison with human life" (1177b23-30). Accordingly, it might well be that Aristotle identifies heroic virtue as great intellectual virtue.
While not without a certain allure, this suggestion cannot be correct. The main and, I believe, insuperable, problem is that heroic virtue is identified as a virtue of character (1145a15-18) and is concerned with action, whereas the virtue of theoretical study is neither of these. 48 Since Aristotle clearly distinguishes between qualities of character and qualities of intellect (1103a3-17, 1178a9-1179a33) and since he identifies heroic virtue as belonging to the former group (1145a15-30), it cannot also be the latter.
The fourth, and final, alternative interpretation of heroic virtue is that it is the virtue of magnanimity. 49 Again, this suggestion is initially attractive, as Aristotle writes, "greatness in each virtue also seems to belong to the magnanimous person" (1123b30). 55 In light of this difficulty, magnanimity also cannot be characterized as the highest degree of virtue (whether or not heroic virtue is the highest degree of virtue). This is again because the former is a particular state, but the latter is general. There is an additional reason to reject the reading of magnanimity as the highest degree of virtue. As we have seen "greatness in each virtue also seems proper to the magnanimous
IV. The doctrine of the mean and heroic virtue
Since the foregoing exhaust the alternative interpretations of heroic virtue, and each should be rejected, we are left with the view that heroic virtue is the highest degree of human virtue. Thus, we have strong reason to conclude that Aristotle conceives of heroic virtue as the highest degree of human virtue, and so, endorses DOV. A thorough discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is not possible here, so I will limit myself to a sketch. 56 In Book II, chapter 6 Aristotle introduces the view that virtue is a mean state since it aims at the mean both in feelings and in action between deficiency and excess. He tells us that there are a number of different considerations that determine the mean in a particular situation, namely, the time at which one is acting, the things and people involved, the reasons for which one acts, and the ways in which one acts. Given all of these parameters, Aristotle concludes that there are many ways to be wrong but only one way to be right (1106b35).
Even with only an outline, the problem for fitting heroic virtue with the doctrine of the mean is obvious: if virtue must hit the mean between two extremes, then for any given situation, and for any given individual in that situation, there is only one feeling/action pair that is right. arguing that most vices do not include excess or deficiency but result from the agent feeling the wrong emotion toward the wrong object. In response, Curzer 1996 argues against Hursthouse's metaphorical reading by arguing that an agent feeling the wrong emotion toward the wrong object can be understood in terms of excess or deficiency across at least one of the virtue parameters. At any rate, if Hursthouse is correct and "vices are not excesses or deficiencies but just ways of going wrong" (71), then the doctrine of the mean doesn't seem to provide any particular trouble for heroic virtue. Accordingly, I will assume a literal understanding of the doctrine.
57 Paula Gottlieb pointed out to me in her comments at the APA Central 2014 that the problem is exacerbated if we take Aristotle's claim that the mean is 'relative to us' (πρὸς ἡμᾶς, e.g., 1106b7) to indicate that the mean is relative to the particular agent. If this were so, then even if we suppose that there could be a person with heroic virtue, in any situation she faced, the mean would be relative to her. But in a heroic virtue in addition to non-heroic virtue, it looks like there must be more than a single mean. That is, if the only way to act correctly is to hit the mean, then it looks like there is no room for heroic virtue; either an agent hits the mean, and so acts well, or misses the mean, and so does not. 58 Thus, an agent can only act well or not, and so, there is no room for heroic virtue. As I shall argue, however, there are several possible differences between heroic virtue and non-heroic virtue, and DOV generally, that are consistent with the doctrine of the mean. I turn to them now.
A mean-friendly account of heroic virtue
In this last section of the paper I offer three possible differences between those with heroic virtue and those with non-heroic virtue. 59 Although my focus is on heroic virtue, structurally similar situation, a person with non-heroic virtue would have a different mean, one relative to him. If this second agent attempted to hit the mean of the agent with heroic virtue, he would be overshooting his own mean, and so, acting badly. But-and this is what poses the problem for heroic virtue-since it is relative to her, when the heroically good agent hits the mean, the action is not heroically good, but is (simply) good. Fortunately, Brown 1997 Brown (cf. 2014 has argued convincingly that we should not take Aristotle as saying that the mean is agent-relative. Instead, by 'relative to us' we should understand Aristotle as saying that the mean is relative to humans, that is, the kind of creature we are. 58 Curzer 1996, 131 suggests that not all ways of going wrong are vicious, as "minor errors do not amount to vice". Unfortunately, this insight can't help here since the concern is with acting well and it still looks like every time we miss the mean, we fail to do so. 59 A fourth suggestion, not included below, is that the mean is wide, and so consists of many points, rather than a single point. If this were the case, then within the mean there would be points that are either closer or further away from the mean-most point. On this view, hitting anywhere within the mean range would be good and hitting the mean-most point would be heroically good (for a similar suggestion, see Kawall 2009, Aristotle thinks that a difference between heroically and non-heroically good agents is that the former never fail to act in accordance with virtue.
Situations that overstrain human nature
The two foregoing possibilities are promising, though perhaps they fall a bit short of how we might imagine heroic virtue. I suspect that when we hear the term 'heroic virtue' today, we envision actions that go 'beyond the call of duty'. In fact, this intuition seems to fit with Aristotle's own claim that heroic virtue in some sense 'goes beyond' (ὑπερβολὴ) ordinary virtue. Thus, it seems that like us, Aristotle would not limit heroic virtue to the two above suggestions. Indeed, although he does not connect the two discussions, Aristotle does make space for such actions in his ethics. What I have in mind are the passages in which Aristotle discusses situations that 'overstrain human nature' (ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει). 67 For instance, at 1110a24-26 Aristotle writes, "there is pardon whenever someone does a wrong action because of conditions of the sort that overstrain human nature, and that no one would endure". 68 In light of such passages, I
want to offer two characterizations-one weaker, the other stronger-of heroic virtue. Curzer 2005, 235 and Drefcinski 1996, 142. overwhelmingly the case that no one would perform the right action in these situations.
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But that is consistent with someone performing the right action in some such situation.
Further, he is not raising these cases to elaborate on virtue, let alone on heroic virtue, but to tease out a theory of voluntary, involuntary, and mixed actions. Since Aristotle's focus is on voluntary actions, it is reasonable that he should not account for heroic virtue, as he would be doing so at the expense of perspicuity in his present discussion.
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There is a final point I want to make regarding heroic virtue and situations that overstrain human nature. Although I have been employing the term 'heroic virtue', we should recall that Aristotle thinks that this sort of virtue is in some way divine. Thus, we should be sensitive to Aristotle's claim here that human nature (τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν) is overstrained. 74 Perhaps, then, in order to act well in such a situation, a person would have 72 The claim that there are some scenarios in which no one would perform the right action is absent from Aristotle's discussion of being overstrained in his parallel discussion in the Eudemian Ethics (esp. 1225a20-30), which might be taken to support my present contention that Aristotle is speaking generally in the NE discussion. I thank an anonymous referee for Ancient Philosophy for alerting me to this passage. 73 The same can be said for passages that seem to imply a rejection of DOV. In many of these passages
Aristotle is concerned with some particular virtue. Accordingly, it makes sense that he would speak in generalities, focusing on typical cases without getting bogged down by examples that run contrary to what is usual (cf. Cooper 1999, 320) . I thank Tal Brewer for discussion here.
74 Cf. EE 1225a20-30. We find a similar point in Plato's Laws. At 875a1-d2 the Athenian initially claims that human nature will always drive a person to look to his own advantage. But he then allows that it is possible that some person with a special nature from the gods could overcome these human pitfalls, and so would not need to be constrained by laws (cf. 691c5-d1, 713c6). Thus, as in my reading of Aristotle's discussion, the Athenian's point is about the limitations of human nature. And both discussions, I suggest, allow for the possibility that someone special could overcome the limitations imposed by human nature.
to surpass her human nature in some sense. 75 And if a person did act finely in such a situation, we might feel compelled to say that in some sense she overcame her human nature to perform the best possible action. Indeed, as we have seen there is good reason to think that this is just how Aristotle describes the person with heroic virtue.
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Conclusion
We have covered much ground in order to arrive at this conclusion. So, it will be worthwhile to retrace our steps. 
